The Russian invasion of Ukraine has dramatically changed the International Relations landscape. It has also made nearly everyone who watches the news an armchair military strategy expert. The Policy Insights Forum (PIF), in partnership with Samuel Associates, has decided to cut through the noise around the War by interviewing our top defence experts each week. This is a five-part series authored by Jay Heisler, a Policy Research Associate with the PIF who is currently volunteering on the U.S. side of the Ukraine evacuation.
This week, we will discuss air force strategy in a fast-moving conflict with retired Royal Canadian Air Force Commander Yvan Blondin. Yvan has served in NORAD in the U.S., Afghanistan, and former Yugoslavia. He holds a BA Degree from the University of Manitoba and an MBA from the University of Phoenix in Arizona. Yvan provided us with a unique take on the War that proved to be an invaluable and unique insight into Russian strategy that this author has seen yet.
There are three takeaways here.
First, Yvan explains that Russian goals appear to run contrary to the media narrative, which is either the highly misleading claim that Russia is just supporting operations in Donbas with a limited military engagement or that Russia is attempting a total annexation and occupation of Ukraine. There may have been an early attempt to see if such a total occupation was possible, but now the goals seem to have become more pragmatic. Yvan believes that the Russians appear to have had two goals in mind: to seize more Russian-backed territory in Ukraine to expand their territory in Donbas and link up their territory in Crimea with Donbas, and to quickly topple the government in Kiev and replace it with a more favorable government. Yvan believes that it was in fact planned as a limited operation, in geography and in time, as Putin has claimed, but with these as the goals.
Second, Yvan believes that the air force side of the war was informed by these goals. Air operations on the Russian side seemed geared primarily toward gaining local air superiority, supporting a ground run at Kiev’s government centres and on expanding previous territory gained in the east.
“You don’t need to destroy everything in Ukraine,” Yvan told us. “Russia has learned from what Western countries have done in the past. Get rid of air defenses, shut down radar, shut down runways, take air power out of Ukraine’s toolbox and then, let the ground forces do their work.”
Yvan said that the Russians then famously encountered far more resistance than they had planned for.
“After the early phase of offensive counter air operations, the air support requirement was reduced; it was just ground forces going to Kiev, which should have been easy” Yvan said about the period following the first few days of the war. “Except they ended up with a lot more resistance than they thought they’d have. They miscalculated how willing every Ukrainian was to become a warrior, to not give in, and the amount of small portable MANPADs, anti-tank weapons and small arms they would have access to through western means.”
Third, Yvan said the remaining needed air operations were mostly in support of ground movements, which actually left Russian planes and helicopters vulnerable to being shot down.
“Most of the opposition is not coming from the air side, from the Ukrainian side,” he told us. “It’s coming from ambushes, a surprisingly high number of sophisticated MANPADS used guerilla-style.”
“Russia’s need from the air is mostly in support of their troops… You can’t do this from 30,000 feet, it needs to be done at much lower levels, mostly in a visual environment below the clouds, and this is where you are most vulnerable to small arms and MANPADS. And that’s dangerous. This is Afghanistan’s Russian nightmare scenario.”
“They’re having difficulties and they’re getting shot down,” he added. “It’s localized, and resistance is coming from people Russia did not count on who have shoulder weapons Russia did not expect.” This is why we do not see more offensive Russian air activity in Ukraine right now.
Feel free to contact the Policy Insights Forum for more insights into the War. In the coming weeks, we will continue to discuss strategy in the Russian invasion with experts from Samuel Associates on the Space and Cyber domains.
