Dear Prime Minister,
I congratulate you on your recent election to lead our nation.
Starting before you were elected to lead the Liberal Party and then during the federal election (from 25 February onward), an array of pledges spoke to improvements needed in capacity and capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Specifically, your intentions were clear regarding the recruiting/retention issues and the military weapons systems platform shortfalls, as well as the challenged acquisition and procurement system. These three are linked, as timely delivery by the purchasing system of state of the art equipment is critical to potential recruits volunteering to serve with unlimited liability on dangerous missions overseas.
I commend the many related policy intentions within your election platform, but I my experience of 38 years in uniform and a subsequent decade as a Public Servant (advancing weapon systems platform acquisition projects for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Canadian Army) tell me that implementation is likely to be problematic.
To state the obvious, accountability to voters and taxpayers is critical to every strong democracy, and best maintained though transparency that builds understanding and credibility in the institutions that implement policy. Sadly it seems a prerequisite of present day election campaigns to exude confidence through declarative statements beginning with “My government will…” And yet, even when detailed and resourced plans exist for intended outcomes, the complexity of governing a nation in the globally interconnected world of today means that plans will often be disrupted or fail. Two elements are recommended to ‘change the channel’: regular periodic government communications should reflect the adoption of a more realistic strategy of adaptation, trial and error; and expectations should be lowered to a level more attuned to the disruptive impacts of complexity more akin to “My government will endeavor to…”
Two major risks could derail all of your intended enhancements for the CAF if left unattended: the lack of capable talent available in sufficient numbers to progress the acquisition and procurement initiatives, and what some now refer to as the complexity debt inherent in such a program of work.
In terms of talent, past government programs during my 48 years that were designed to rein in waste have always resulted in significant personnel reductions within the Department of National Defence (DND). More recently, the personnel cadre engaged in acquisition projects was never spared and often kept afloat employing contract support – the latter being presently out of favour with the government. While the introduction of AI and machine learning can ameliorate operational performance, I believe it will take decades to compile sufficient valid data on complex acquisition projects to enhance project performance. Given the obvious requirement to find significant new talent to implement what looks like an approximate doubling of DND’s capital budget by 28/29, three actions are required to best acquire new talent while avoiding this existential threat to an enhanced CAF:
- Any caps on DND’s hiring or reductions of personnel related to major weapons platform capital projects must be avoided.
- Contracted-in project support – even entire project management offices under contract – must be encouraged to address talent shortfalls.
- Noting the implementation of dramatic personnel reductions by this US Administration, aggressive hiring to tap into the resulting ‘brain drain’ is an opportunity that we are already behind in exploiting, suggesting that this activity be boosted through accelerated immigration action and generous relocation allowances.
The implementation complexity of transitioning to a Defence Procurement Agency has been assessed by senior procurement officials in the past as offering some advantages, but at the expense of the loss of years of momentum. The necessary reform of the acquisition culture and processes is indeed daunting, particularly concurrent with the launch of many new equipment acquisition projects. To minimize such losses, a judicious transition strategy would leave projects now in the Definition phase to continue in the current government structure, with new projects and those in Implementation addressed under a reformed acquisition and procurement model.
In terms of specific objectives intended, some cautionary notes on likely implementation challenges and potential mitigating strategies follow:
- In terms of the RCN fleet, three considerations seem appropriate:
o The government’s naval icebreaker proposal circa 2005 required much discussion before the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessel project took shape. Before embarking on the acquisition of Polar class icebreakers for the RCN, the Commander of our navy should be consulted to ensure maximum utility will accrue, as other surface hulls may be of more value for the considerable expense involved.
o While the National Shipbuilding Strategy is well on its way to recreating warship shipbuilding capacity, the need for additional RCN surface vessels is apparent and requires creative solutions to expedite new hulls beyond the Joint Support ships, the River Class destroyers and submarines.
o As an important additional security measure while outfitting Coast Guard vessels with broader Arctic surveillance capabilities, it would be appropriate to consider arming them with containerized weapon systems as well, perhaps initially operated by small detachments of RCN personnel.
- The intended additional investment of $30 billion dollars over the next four years will be welcome. While every effort is made not to lapse funds allocated to DND, it is an unavoidable consequence of progressing complex projects. In pursuit of every dollar assigned to Canada’s defence remaining within National Defence, delayed dollars spent mean they are insufficient to deliver the same amount of capability at a later date. To address this cost of unavoidable lapsing, a top-up mechanism should be included to neutralize the impact of inflation in the year that it is re-profiled.
- The desire to ensure that troops in Canada have the same equipment capabilities as those deployed on contingency operations abroad has often ran afoul of Treasury Board (TB) policies when urgent sole source procurements were approved for such offshore operations. The policy prohibited such capabilities from becoming part of the CAF’s longer term capability, thus constraining CAF-wide training vehicle purchase. It is recommended that TB policies be more flexible.
- I note the intention to partner with our allies on procurement for the next generation of aircrafts and to review the F-35 procurement. In terms of international collaborative development projects, Canada has failed in the past in multi-nation initiatives which routinely were derailed as each nation’s industrial requirements exploded. In terms of the F-35, technician manpower to support two or more fleets of jet fighters will exacerbate the talent and training challenge. It is therefore recommended that Canada complete the planned fleet procurement of F-35 jet fighters, but that concerns with purchasing US military systems be tempered by the required equipment’s capabilities and the viability of assured domestic support pathways once in service.
- With respect to the creation of a centralized Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), my experience was that the accountability challenges extant in multiple Ministers’ involvement rarely impeded any of my seven billion-dollar projects. However, the lack of Service Level Agreements between the many silos within and between departments involved made planning cumbersome, open to schedule slippage and frequently late to need as early as contract award. The major advantage of a DPA is the opportunity to embrace a new innovative culture that is less risk adverse, something I have explored elsewhere in a paper on the Policy Insights Forum website. Nevertheless, speed is of the essence with fresh eyes and ideas essential to maximizing the value of a DPA. To avoid the natural and inherent reluctance of current acquisition and procurement staff to embrace innovation, it should be guided in its reform efforts by an external advisory committee reporting to the Privy Council Office (PCO), with the advice provided defaulting to acceptance unless PCO determines that there is a compelling policy rationale not to do so.
- On the face of it, the proposed budget framework separating operating and capital budget allocations looks similar to the DND approach employed in the past, one that prevented the agile employment of allocated funding without considerable bureaucracy to allow amendments to internal allocations. DND must deal with frequent emerging requirements related to domestic and international disruptions. To avoid the challenges of the past, a degree of flexibility unfettered by bureaucracy should be built in, by setting threshold levels for each allocated ‘colour of money’ that can only be exceeded with the approval of either the Deputy Minister or Minister of National Defence.
Exercising author’s privilege I would raise one area that seems to have been overlooked by all parties – Canada’s resilience to and response during climate extremes, and the toll of such responses on the CAF. There is a well recognized requirement for the CAF to provide their professional communications and transport resources. However no matter the strength of the CAF, it should otherwise be the force of very last resort in responding to climate extremes. It would seem appropriate to consider creating a National Climate Extreme Response Service Corps, with incentives such as generous monetary subsidies for years/hours invested, applicable to first home purchases, tuition at post-secondary education institutions and trades schools, and Registered Education Saving Plans for the participants’ children.
Prime Minister, I wish you every success and an essential measure of luck during your mandate leading our nation and improving the capabilities and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Respectfully yours,
Rear-Admiral (Retired) Ian Mack
