Amid shifting geopolitical alliances and escalating cross-border economic friction, Canada can no longer rely on external allies whose intelligence is shaped by their own political and commercial priorities. Passive consumption of foreign intelligence leaves critical assets—including: critical minerals, intellectual property, supply chains and information integrity —exposed to trade leverage, coercive tactics, information manipulation, interference and espionage. A sovereign Canadian foreign intelligence capability establishes decision advantage, securing Canada-first insights controlled across the entire intelligence lifecycle. By deploying an agile, data-driven model that integrates targeted overseas human intelligence with trusted Canadian technology, open sources, Canadian commercial sensors and services Canada can protect its national security, economic prosperity, sovereignty and ensures its global interests are actively informed by Canadian insights and values.

We are much closer to a foreign intelligence service than any time in history, for three reasons:

1. The imperative for sovereign intelligence given geopolitics and a new world order;
2. Dramatic advances in commercial technology, sensors and sources, necessitating a recalibration of the intelligence enterprise. Such a Service would be predicated on public-private partnerships; and
3. Canada already has the building blocks of a national capability and we know precisely how to assemble a service quickly, effectively, at low cost with minimal risks.

In an era defined by new geopolitics, rapid technological shifts, grey-zone competition, and economic coercion, Canada finds itself at a strategic crossroads. While we have long relied on the collective security of our allies, the modern landscape of statecraft demands a more independent approach. To safeguard our prosperity and security, Canada must transition from being a passive consumer of foreign intelligence to a proactive producer of sovereign insight. Establishing a dedicated foreign intelligence capability is no longer an institutional luxury; it is a strategic imperative for the twenty-first century. What form this takes has been a point of discussion for quite some time.

The fundamental challenge for Canadian executives and policymakers is "decision advantage"—the ability to see clearly through the noise of global disinformation and strategic competition to make informed choices. Currently, Canada remains uniquely dependent on international partners, particularly within the Five Eyes alliance, for critical foreign intelligence. While these partnerships are invaluable, they introduce inherent risks: the intelligence we receive is inevitably filtered through the geopolitical lenses and political priorities and personalities of other nations. When Canada relies on external assessments, we risk inheriting biases that may not align with our specific national interests, such as Arctic sovereignty, natural resource security, or the protection of our unique diaspora communities.

A sovereign intelligence capability would provide Canada-first assessments, granting our leaders control over the entire intelligence lifecycle—from tasking and collection to analysis and dissemination. This is particularly critical in the "war on truth," where foreign influence and information manipulation increasingly target democratic institutions and private-sector stability. By building a "cognitive defence network," Canada can proactively counter these narratives with truth-based, Canadian-valued perspectives, ensuring our strategic environment is shaped by our own hands rather than by adversaries or even well-meaning allies.

One of the most innovative aspects of this proposed evolution is the deep integration of Canada’s mature private-sector ecosystem. Canadian industry already conducts sophisticated global risk management and deep competitive intelligence drawing from foreign sources. Canadian companies have been providing goods and services to allied foreign intelligence agencies since the second world war. They are street-smart and capable. By leveraging this sovereign industrial base, a new agency could accelerate its operational capacity through public-private partnerships. This hybrid model would use commercial sensors, big data analytics, and agentic AI to deliver insights at the "speed of relevance," reducing capital costs while strengthening a secure domestic digital supply chain.

The benefits of such a capability extend directly into the boardroom. Economic security is increasingly inseparable from national security. Canadian firms are prime targets for state-sponsored industrial espionage, intellectual property theft, and supply chain manipulation. A dedicated foreign intelligence capability would act as a strategic enabler for Canadian competitiveness, providing early warning of foreign takeover attempts, sanctions evasion, or hostile actors targeting our critical minerals and emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. It would essentially serve as a forward-leaning defence for Canada’s economic interests abroad.

Furthermore, Canada currently faces a "HUMINT gap"—a lack of a dedicated institution tasked with the clandestine recruitment and management of human sources overseas. While our diplomatic and military entities provide valuable reporting, their mandates are overtly constrained or mission-specific. A sovereign clandestine service would fill this void, uncovering the intentions behind the capabilities of foreign actors. Understanding "why" a decision is being made in a foreign capital is often more valuable than simply knowing "what" is happening on the ground. This gap can also be closed to a degree with online or remote operations.

The implementation of this capability does not require the sprawling bureaucracy of a CIA-style entity. Instead, Canada can build an agile, "edge-based" fusion model. By integrating data from open sources, commercial signals, subject matter experts and human intelligence at the point of collection, we can preserve context and provenance that is often lost in traditional, siloed reporting. Operationally, the agency would prioritize low-risk, high-impact capabilities in its early phases. This data-centric approach, supported by robust oversight and an Act of Parliament, ensures that our intelligence activities remain transparent to the public and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

A defining feature of this model is the strategic use of commercial intelligence. The proposed capability would be calibrated for cooperation and coverage in a networked world. It would align closely with allies and partners while contributing unique Canadian capabilities, particularly in areas such as Arctic sovereignty, economic intelligence, and emerging domains of cognitive warfare. At the same time, it would close critical technical and human intelligence gaps that currently limit Canada’s situational awareness. The agency would adopt an all-source intelligence model, integrating open source, human, signals, cyber and commercial data streams at the edge to produce timely, actionable insights. Recognizing that the majority of modern intelligence is derived from open sources, the establishment of a robust open source intelligence Centre with industry —supported by a clandestine service—would provide the fastest and most cost-effective path to initial operating capability.

A goal is to achieve "cognitive sovereignty". In a world where information is weaponized and global power dynamics are shifting, Canada cannot afford to be a spectator in its own security narrative. By investing in a modern, agile, and sovereign foreign intelligence capability, we reinforce our position as a credible global partner and ensure that Canadian interests are defended by Canadian insights. It is time for Canada to move from the sidelines to the center of its own strategic future.

One can envision this happening in a number of ways (maybe a blend):

1. Remove two words “within Canada” from Section 16 of the CSIS act and fund the Service according to expand its mandate and capabilities;
2. Build a separate foreign intelligence service from the ground up; and
3. Continue to operate in a federated model for the government while extending the capability to include an open-source centre and a cognitive defence network operated jointly with the private sector.

The calculus for each one of these scenarios has been exhaustively discussed, debated, deliberated and meticulously drafted by intelligence professionals.[1] Technology and circumstances have provided us both the means and motivation to fully realize the designs.

The value proposition is clear. A sovereign Canadian foreign intelligence capability will enhance national security, support economic prosperity, defend democratic institutions, and reinforce Canada’s position in a rapidly evolving world order while informing executive decisions. By embracing open source and commercial intelligence, leveraging domestic industry, trusted private sector partners and embedding strong governance and oversight, Canada can build a modern, agile, and effective foreign intelligence capability. This is not only a necessary evolution of the national security enterprise—it is a strategic recalibration for a new world order.