Published on:
October 7, 2026
Canada National Security Policy in an Era of Constitutional Uncertainty
Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt
Federal cohesion, foreign interference, alliance obligations, and strategic autonomy
Canada retains the constitutional authority and material resources to renew its national security policy, but its ability to sustain that renewal increasingly depends on the political and administrative cohesion of the federation. The election of a sovereigntist minority government in Quebec, Alberta’s consideration of a future independence referendum, foreign interference, NATO’s defence investment pledge and uncertainty in relations with the United States create interacting constraints on strategic decision-making. This paper argues that their cumulative importance lies in the possibility that Canada’s external commitments will outpace the domestic arrangements required to implement them. Drawing on constitutional law, official security assessments, contemporary policy documents and theories of domestic bargaining and state capacity, it examines the connections between democratic legitimacy, economic resilience and military readiness. Constitutional advocacy must remain protected, while covert interference and coercion require effective responses. The paper proposes a national security strategy supported by a federal resilience agreement, credible spending and procurement plans, stronger intelligence accountability and a differentiated approach to international partners. Canada’s capacity to adapt will depend on whether it can convert formal sovereignty into reliable collective action while preserving the democratic legitimacy on which that sovereignty rests.
Canada’s national security problem in October 2026 concerns the reliability of the political community through which security decisions are made. Ottawa can announce a strategy, authorize expenditure and negotiate with allies. The more difficult question is whether those decisions can remain credible through constitutional contestation, economic pressure and successive electoral mandates. Policy renewal therefore requires an assessment of the federation’s capacity to act collectively, alongside an assessment of the threats confronting it.
The immediate political circumstances require precision. The Parti Québécois won Quebec’s 5 October election without obtaining a legislative majority and is returning to government with an independence agenda. [1] In Alberta, the 19 October referendum includes a non-binding choice between remaining a province and beginning the legal process for a later separation referendum. [2] A separate citizen initiative petition concerning independence met the signature requirements, according to Elections Alberta’s July announcement, but further steps remained stayed pending court direction. [3] These developments establish constitutional uncertainty; they do not establish that either province has chosen independence.
That uncertainty coincides with demands for greater military investment, protection against foreign interference and a reassessment of Canada’s dependence on its principal economic and security partner. These pressures interact. A prolonged constitutional dispute could consume political attention needed for procurement reform. Tariff pressure could deepen regional grievances. Foreign actors could exploit controversy over either issue. Defence expenditure could strengthen domestic industry, yet lose public support if its benefits and costs appear geographically unequal. The policy problem is consequently one of managing relationships among risks that are usually addressed by separate institutions.
This paper uses qualitative policy analysis and conditional scenario reasoning. Its evidence comprises publicly accessible material available on 7 October 2026, with particular attention to legislation, official assessments and announced commitments. It does not estimate the probability of secession, attribute foreign involvement in the Quebec election or Alberta’s referendum process, or treat government spending announcements as proof of operational capability. Where it examines possible consequences, these are analytical inferences rather than findings that those consequences have occurred.
The central proposition is that Canada can update its national security policy, but a durable update must strengthen the domestic conditions of implementation. Federal authority remains substantial. Its effectiveness depends on an ability to maintain public consent, coordinate dispersed institutions and deliver capabilities under fiscal and international constraints.
Robert Putnam’s account of diplomacy as a two-level game offers a useful starting point. International agreements must be acceptable to domestic constituencies as well as foreign negotiating partners. [4] Applied here, the framework directs attention to the distance between the commitments Ottawa can make internationally and those it can sustain politically at home. Provincial governments, Parliament, industry and affected communities shape that distance through their influence over implementation and legitimacy. This is an application of Putnam’s framework, rather than a claim that provincial assent is legally required for every security decision.
Michael Mann’s distinction between despotic and infrastructural state power supplies a complementary perspective. His analysis connects state autonomy to the organization of authority across territory. [5] For the purposes of this paper, implementation capacity means the practical ability to turn an authorized decision into action across institutions and regions. A government may possess ample legal authority while lacking the personnel, information systems or cooperation needed to exercise it consistently. Increasing coercive discretion would offer little remedy for an inability to recruit specialists or maintain critical infrastructure.
These perspectives suggest four tests for policy renewal. A strategy needs democratic legitimacy, so that citizens accept the purposes and limits of security action. It needs coordination among institutions whose responsibilities overlap. It needs resources that can be converted into trained people and usable equipment. It also needs international credibility, so that partners can plan around Canada’s commitments. Failure in any of these areas can weaken the others: poor delivery damages trust, while diminished trust makes sustained funding harder to secure.
Federalism can complicate these requirements, but it can also support them. Provincial institutions provide knowledge of local infrastructure and communities that Ottawa cannot reproduce centrally. Regional economic strengths offer a distributed industrial foundation. Constitutional disagreement may encourage more transparent bargaining over priorities. The relevant question is whether disagreement can be managed through institutions that preserve essential cooperation. Political diversity becomes a security vulnerability when it obstructs necessary functions or creates opportunities for coercion, rather than simply because competing identities exist.
Canada’s 2004 national security policy established an integrated approach spanning intelligence, emergency management, public health, transport and border security. [6] Subsequent initiatives have expanded this policy architecture. The 2024 defence policy promised a national security strategy every four years; the 2025 cyber security strategy emphasized cooperation across society; and the February 2026 Defence Industrial Strategy introduced a framework for building domestic capability, partnering with allies and acquiring equipment. [7–9] These measures provide substantial foundations for renewal.
The task is to connect their assumptions, priorities and implementation plans. A defence policy may require secure communications that depend on privately operated networks. An industrial strategy may depend on access to mineral processing, reliable electricity and skilled workers. A trade initiative may create investment opportunities whose security implications require separate examination. Without an integrating strategy, government can pursue individually defensible policies whose combined effects have received insufficient scrutiny.
The prolonged instability associated with Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has made assumptions of an enduring European peace untenable. [10] Conflict and escalation risks in the Middle East, including those involving Iran, add pressures on energy markets and diplomatic attention. [11] A crisis around Taiwan would present a different combination of military, technological and supply-chain risks. These theatres warrant differentiated assessments. Their common implication for Canadian planning is that disruption must be treated as a recurring condition, with preparedness maintained between crises.
Adaptation should nevertheless avoid making national security an unlimited justification for government intervention. Threats require distinctions among armed aggression, espionage, economic dependence, commercial rivalry and lawful political disagreement. An integrated policy should improve the precision of those distinctions. Otherwise, expanding the security agenda could dilute priorities and weaken the legitimacy required to address the most consequential threats.
Quebec’s election alters the political setting in which Ottawa seeks long-term cooperation, while leaving the present constitutional division of powers intact. Defence remains a federal responsibility under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867; provincial authority over important economic and social domains, including resources and electricity, continues alongside it. [12] A sovereigntist government can therefore participate in the administration of the existing federation while advocating a different constitutional future. Security planning must accommodate that distinction.
The Supreme Court’s Secession Reference rejected unilateral secession under the existing constitutional framework. A clear majority on a clear question would create an obligation to negotiate, with democracy considered alongside federalism, the rule of law and minority rights. [13] The Clarity Act provides for federal consideration of the question and majority and identifies matters that negotiations must address, including assets, liabilities, borders and Indigenous interests. [14] A provincial election, a consultative vote and a constitutionally consequential referendum are distinct events.
Quebec’s strategic relevance extends beyond parliamentary arithmetic. Its position within Canada connects central Canadian activity to Atlantic routes and northern territory; its firms, infrastructure and public institutions contribute to national capacity. A period of constitutional negotiation could raise questions about the continuity of defence contracts, federal facilities, transport access and infrastructure arrangements. Such questions should enter contingency analysis without assumptions that Quebec would obstruct those functions. Businesses and governments may need clarity about future arrangements even where cooperation remains strong.
Alberta presents a related issue through a different economic and geographical setting.
Its October ballot asks whether a further legal process should begin. [2] Energy production and access to export infrastructure would be central to any subsequent constitutional debate. Independence would not remove dependence on transit routes, markets or neighbouring jurisdictions. A responsible assessment would examine those relationships alongside the aspirations motivating separation, without presuming either economic collapse or an uncomplicated path to self-sufficiency.
The two cases also affect federal bargaining before any referendum on actual separation. Governments and investors deciding on projects with long operating lives may seek greater assurance about tax, regulatory and contractual continuity. Ottawa may face pressure to allocate resources in ways that demonstrate the value of federation. Those pressures do not necessarily prevent sound policy. They make transparent criteria more important, particularly where security investments also confer regional economic benefits.
Indigenous nations require an independent place in this analysis. The Clarity Act expressly recognizes their rights, interests and territorial claims as matters for negotiation. [14] Neither a provincial government nor Ottawa can responsibly describe a constitutional transition as a transaction involving only two political communities. Planning should provide meaningful participation by affected Indigenous governments and avoid predetermining territorial outcomes. This is especially consequential where proposed infrastructure intersects with treaty relationships or contested jurisdiction.
Canada should prepare for constitutional uncertainty through arrangements that protect essential services and maintain lawful cooperation. Appropriate subjects include emergency communications, critical infrastructure, federal facilities and the continuity of contractual obligations. Such preparation can reduce uncertainty while democratic debate proceeds. It should remain institutionally separate from partisan campaigning, so that citizens can assess constitutional choices without suspecting that the security apparatus has become an instrument of political persuasion.
The protection of that institutional separation is itself a security requirement. Section 2 of the CSIS Act excludes lawful advocacy, protest and dissent from its definition of security threats unless associated with the specified threat activities. [15] Advocacy for Quebec or Alberta independence therefore cannot, by itself, establish grounds for treating participants as security threats. Investigations require evidence of relevant conduct, including covert influence, coercion, espionage or violence. This legal boundary protects both individual rights and the credibility of intelligence work.
The Hogue Commission’s conclusions demonstrate why precision matters. Its January 2025 report found that foreign interference did not determine which party formed government in the 2019 or 2021 federal elections and that the electoral system was administered with integrity. It nevertheless identified possible effects in a small number of ridings and nomination contests, together with weaknesses in government coordination, information transmission and public communication. [16] These findings support institutional improvement while resisting sweeping claims that foreign actors control Canadian election outcomes. They do not establish what occurred in subsequent provincial processes.
CSIS’s 2025 public report identifies interference and espionage directed at institutions across government, business, academia and civil society, as well as intimidation affecting communities in Canada. [17] The breadth of these targets makes an exclusively election-period response inadequate. Influence may be cultivated through professional relationships, covert financing, commercial access or pressure on individuals whose relatives live abroad. Provincial and municipal institutions can require support even when the federal electoral system is functioning effectively.
Canada has introduced an additional transparency mechanism. The inaugural Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner was appointed on 4 August 2026, and the first registered arrangements became publicly available in September. [18] Registration documents specified relationships involving foreign principals; it does not in itself establish wrongdoing. Its value will depend on effective validation, compliance and enforcement, together with clear public explanations of what the information means. A register cannot substitute for the investigative capacity needed to identify concealed arrangements.
Constitutional controversy could create opportunities for external manipulation because disputes over identity and economic fairness attract intense public attention. This is a plausible risk mechanism, not evidence that foreign states caused current separatist movements. Responses should focus on verifiable conduct and protect those subjected to intimidation. They should also recognize that Canadian communities associated with an interfering state may be among the people most exposed to its coercion. Ancestry provides no reliable basis for attributing allegiance or security risk.
Trust requires a disciplined approach to disclosure. Authorities should explain the nature of substantiated interference and the response taken while protecting intelligence sources, procedural fairness and personal safety. They should distinguish information that is known from assessments made with uncertainty. Where allegations are contested, credible correction mechanisms matter. Otherwise, the public response to interference could amplify the loss of confidence that an external actor seeks to produce.
Economic security connects domestic constitutional questions to international competition. CSIS describes attempts by state actors to obtain sensitive Canadian research and technology, including through collaboration arrangements that obscure the interests involved. [17] The Cyber Centre’s 2025–2026 assessment also identifies serious risks from state-sponsored operations and ransomware, including threats to critical infrastructure. [19] These assessments concern the integrity of systems on which ordinary economic activity and defence both depend.
Security evaluation should therefore examine how control, access and dependence operate. A foreign investment may provide capital without creating decisive leverage. Another arrangement may confer access to sensitive data, allow remote control of infrastructure or concentrate an essential supply in a single provider. Research collaboration can be valuable while requiring protection for particular technologies. Risk assessment needs to identify those mechanisms, rather than treating every international relationship as equivalent.
The competition for critical minerals and energy increases the importance of such judgments. Canada’s critical minerals policy links production and processing to resilient value chains, Indigenous partnership and defence needs. [20] Resource abundance offers potential influence, but its strategic value depends on the ability to develop projects, process materials and reach markets. A deposit that cannot be responsibly developed or whose output depends on a vulnerable processing route offers limited assurance of supply during a crisis.
Federal cohesion consequently has an economic security dimension. Projects spanning jurisdictions require durable arrangements over approvals, infrastructure and the distribution of benefits. Regional disputes can become more difficult to resolve when citizens perceive that national objectives impose local costs without adequate participation. A national strategy should explain why particular projects matter, evaluate alternatives and integrate rights and environmental obligations into planning. Predictable processes can support investment while giving affected communities a credible means of influencing decisions.
Diversification should be evaluated through its effects on concentrated dependence. Multiple customers offer little protection if exports still rely on one transport corridor or processing country. Similarly, nominally domestic production can retain dependence on foreign software, components or maintenance permissions. Policy should identify such dependencies and decide where additional capacity, inventories or alternative suppliers justify their cost. Economic resilience requires selective investment guided by consequences, rather than an unattainable ambition to produce everything domestically.
NATO’s June 2025 Hague declaration commits allies to defence and security investment totalling 5 percent of GDP annually by 2035. It specifies at least 3.5 percent for core defence and up to 1.5 percent for wider purposes, including infrastructure, networks and civil resilience. Allies must present annual plans, and the trajectory and balance are to be reviewed in 2029. [21] The distinction between these categories is essential to assessing Canada’s obligations and the public spending required.
Canada’s government announced that defence expenditure reached the 2-percent benchmark in fiscal year 2025–26. [22] This provides a more current starting point than accounts based on earlier shortfalls. It remains a spending measure. The strategic question is how the next phase of investment will increase the availability and effectiveness of capabilities, including the personnel, maintenance and infrastructure needed to sustain them.
The scale of the change requires fiscal candour. Moving from 2 to 3.5 percent represents a 75-percent increase in the share of GDP allocated to core defence. This is arithmetic using those two benchmarks, rather than a forecast of cash expenditure. Changes in nominal GDP, inflation, classification and appropriations will affect the amounts involved. The wider security category must be examined separately. Treating the combined 5 percent as a directly comparable increase in the military budget would obscure both its composition and its fiscal implications.
Financing that increase requires choices about revenue, borrowing and other expenditure. Those choices can affect the political consent on which a sustained defence program depends, particularly when households face pressure and provinces seek support for health care or infrastructure. Government should explain the anticipated fiscal path and test it against weaker growth and higher procurement costs. Constitutional uncertainty adds a separate planning concern: any negotiated change in the federation would require analysis of both the economic base and the obligations retained. A smaller GDP would not, by itself, imply an easier defence burden, because geography, fixed costs and security requirements would also matter. These are reasons to test fiscal resilience under alternative conditions, without treating separation as a forecast or using projected defence costs to prejudge constitutional debate.
Implementation constraints are demonstrable. The Auditor General’s 2025 recruitment audit found that the Canadian Armed Forces had not recruited and trained enough applicants to meet operational requirements. It identified fragmented accountability, disconnected information systems and lengthy processing times. [23] The audit covers an earlier period and should not be treated as proof that every weakness remains unchanged in October 2026. It nevertheless establishes why additional appropriations need to be accompanied by evidence that institutional processes can absorb them.
The 2026 Defence Industrial Strategy provides a means of connecting procurement with domestic production and allied partnerships. [9] Its implementation should be judged through delivery schedules, equipment availability and sustainment capacity. Decisions about domestic manufacture should account for urgency and technical feasibility; decisions to purchase abroad should account for access to components, data and repairs. A national security strategy can make these trade-offs explicit, allowing Parliament and industry to assess whether proposed arrangements support the capabilities Canada needs.
The wider investment category creates a further test of federal cooperation. Infrastructure resilience frequently involves provincial, municipal, Indigenous and private responsibilities. Spending can strengthen military mobility and community resilience at the same time, provided its purpose and eligibility are clear. Public accounting should distinguish existing expenditure from additional measures and prevent double counting. Otherwise, apparent progress toward a percentage target could conceal inadequate preparation for the disruptions the expenditure is supposed to address.
The Hague pledge is a political investment commitment associated with the alliance’s capacity to defend itself. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires allies to maintain and develop that capacity; the treaty does not make Article 5 assistance automatically contingent on achieving a spending percentage. [24] Credible investment nevertheless matters to influence and confidence within NATO. Canada’s strategy should connect the pledge to assessed capability requirements and democratic budget decisions, giving citizens a basis for evaluating the costs across competing public priorities.
Canada’s relationship with the United States combines extensive mutual benefit with unequal capacity to impose economic costs. Global Affairs Canada’s account of the July 2026 CUSMA review confirms continuing Canadian support for renewal while identifying unresolved sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum, autos and lumber. It also states that CUSMA remains in force until 2036, subject to its renewal framework. [25] Review uncertainty and tariff pressure should therefore be analyzed without assuming that the agreement has already ended.
Continental defence cooperation remains a major Canadian interest. NORAD modernization encompasses surveillance, command systems, infrastructure and related capabilities. [26] Canada benefits from a shared warning and defence architecture, while contributing geography, facilities and capabilities essential to its operation. Security policy should maintain effective cooperation and strengthen Canada’s ability to make informed decisions within it. This requires technical access and personnel expertise as well as diplomatic engagement.
Economic integration does not eliminate disputes over national interests. Canada should be able to protect its negotiating position without degrading functions that serve both countries. Equally, cooperation on defence should not prevent a clear assessment of vulnerabilities arising from trade concentration or dependence on foreign suppliers. The appropriate response is to identify where continuity serves Canada and where additional options would reduce exposure to pressure. These judgments need to be made sector by sector.
Constitutional disagreement can complicate that approach by encouraging multiple Canadian messages to Washington. Provinces have legitimate interests in relationships that affect their economies. When those interests produce incompatible negotiating positions, an external partner may find it easier to obtain concessions from individual jurisdictions. A durable federal approach should draw provincial priorities into common positions and explain how regional concerns were addressed. Consultation becomes strategically useful when it improves the reliability of the position Canada presents.
Greater autonomy should consequently be understood as greater capacity to choose. Investments in Canadian sustainment, intelligence analysis and infrastructure can improve that capacity within continental cooperation. Partnerships with European and Indo-Pacific allies can add commercial and technological options. Diversification will have limits imposed by geography and economic scale, but it can still reduce particular vulnerabilities. Its success should be measured by the availability of workable alternatives when Canada faces pressure.
China presents a distinct problem because commercial opportunity coexists with serious security concerns. In January 2026, the Canadian government announced a renewed strategic partnership covering energy, trade and other areas of cooperation. [27] Separately, the Cyber Centre characterizes China’s cyber program as the most sophisticated and active state cyber threat to Canada in its 2025–2026 assessment. [19] An updated policy must address both the declared economic relationship and the assessed threat activity, without allowing either to erase the other.
The phrase peer competitor requires care in the Canadian context. China’s global economic and military scale is substantially different from Canada’s, and the expression should not imply equivalence or rivalry in every domain. Canada needs a differentiated policy that supports beneficial, lawful exchange while protecting sensitive capabilities and resisting coercion. That policy should specify how decisions are made when commercial opportunities intersect with infrastructure control, data access or strategically significant technology.
Diversifying trade toward China could reduce exposure in some sectors while creating new concentrations of dependence in others. Decisions require an assessment of substitutability: how quickly could a market, component or financing arrangement be replaced if access were withdrawn? Businesses should have clear guidance about sensitive sectors and predictable review processes. Governments should test whether proposed economic gains remain credible under disruption, including a deterioration in relations or a wider regional crisis.
A Taiwan contingency illustrates the need for preparation without predetermining policy. Canadian planning could examine disruption to advanced technology supplies, maritime trade, financial markets and allied coordination under several levels of escalation. The purpose would be to identify dependencies and decisions that require preparation, rather than assume that conflict is inevitable or that Canada’s response has already been settled. Useful preparation could include supplier alternatives and coordinated continuity exercises with affected industries.
Russia, Iran and other actors require separate assessments reflecting their conduct, capabilities and opportunities to affect Canada. The policy instruments appropriate to armed aggression differ from those used against cybercrime, espionage or transnational repression. Canada should retain the ability to cooperate on a specific issue while responding to harmful conduct elsewhere. A strategy that defines those decisions clearly would give intelligence agencies, regulators and businesses a more consistent framework for action.
A national security strategy should begin by defining the interests to be protected and the choices government must make among competing demands. Its public version should identify major risks, explain priorities and state how progress will be evaluated. Classified planning can address vulnerabilities whose disclosure would be harmful. Periodic renewal, consistent with the commitment made in the 2024 defence policy, would allow government to revise assumptions while preserving accountability for earlier decisions. [7]
Implementation would benefit from a federal resilience agreement involving provincial and territorial governments, with substantive Indigenous participation. Its purpose would be to establish reliable arrangements for functions that cross jurisdictions, including infrastructure protection, emergency communications and appropriate intelligence sharing. Responsibilities and costs should be explicit. Participation should remain open to governments with different constitutional objectives, because residents require secure services while political debate continues. Such an agreement would complement existing legal powers through practical cooperation.
Cabinet should also maintain an integrated assessment of the effects of major decisions. Trade diversification, industrial investment and defence acquisition can each alter strategic dependencies. A common assessment process should identify those effects early and assign responsibility for resolving conflicts among departmental priorities. It need not centralize every decision. Its value would lie in ensuring that consequential interactions receive attention from officials authorized to act on them.
Military investment needs a published sequence that relates annual funding to procurement, training and operational availability. Personnel and sustainment requirements should be assessed before new equipment creates additional obligations. Parliament should be able to compare expenditure with delivery and understand significant departures from plans. Where information is classified, appropriate review should still examine whether reported progress corresponds to usable capability. This would help sustain support through the long period to 2035.
Democratic protection requires similarly clear responsibility. Authorities receiving intelligence about interference should record decisions and ensure that relevant information reaches those who can act lawfully. Election officials, parties, provincial institutions and people facing intimidation need practical channels for assistance. The foreign influence registry should operate alongside investigative and review mechanisms, with transparent enforcement and protections against unjustified reputational harm. The public should be able to distinguish lawful representation of foreign interests from concealed or coercive activity.
Constitutional contingency planning should test the continuity of essential services under prolonged disputes, difficult intergovernmental negotiations and changes in administrative cooperation. It should also evaluate a possible negotiated transition without assuming its outcome or the automatic continuation of treaty, currency and security arrangements. Planning would identify decisions that governments might face and the information needed to make them. Independent scrutiny of its purposes could help protect the boundary between preparedness and political campaigning.
An annual public assessment could then connect the strategy to observable performance. Relevant evidence would include delivery and availability of defence capabilities, retention of trained personnel, preparedness exercises, progress on substantiated interference cases and reductions in critical supply dependencies. Expenditure ratios would remain important, but would sit within a broader account of security outcomes. This approach would make renewal an ongoing practice of governing rather than an occasional statement of ambition.
Canada possesses the authority and resources necessary to update its national security policy. The principal constraint is the durability of the collective arrangements through which that policy must operate. Quebec’s sovereigntist election victory and Alberta’s consultation about a later referendum make those arrangements more politically consequential. Foreign interference, alliance investment demands and uncertainty in external relationships increase the cost of leaving them insufficiently examined.
The resulting challenge calls for constitutional restraint and institutional ambition. Lawful advocacy must remain protected; covert interference and coercion must be addressed through evidence and accountable action. Defence commitments need delivery plans that citizens can assess. Economic partnerships require judgments about dependence and control. Intergovernmental cooperation must be strong enough to protect essential functions while accommodating competing political aspirations.
Canada’s strategic credibility will rest on whether governments can sustain those practices through disagreement and change. A renewed national security policy can contribute by making priorities, responsibilities and trade-offs explicit. Its ultimate test will be the federation’s demonstrated ability to protect democratic choice and deliver the capabilities on which an independent foreign policy depends.
[1] Gillies, Rob. 2026. “Quebec separatists vowingindependence vote win an election but fall short of majority.” AssociatedPress, 6 October. Source
[2] Elections Alberta. 2026. “Referendum.” See the October 19referendum and Question 10, including its non-binding status. Accessed 7October. Source
[3] Elections Alberta. 2026. “Citizen Initiative PetitionVerification Completed, Results Announced.” 24 July. Source
[4] Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42 (3):427–460. Source
[5] Mann, Michael. 1984. “The Autonomous Power of the State:Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results.” European Journal of Sociology 25 (2):185–213. Source
[6] Government of Canada. 2004. “Government of CanadaReleases Comprehensive National Security Policy.” 27 April. Source
[7] Department of National Defence. 2024. Our North, Strongand Free. “II. Our Vision for Defence.” See “A Strategic Approach to NationalSecurity.” Source
[8] Public Safety Canada. 2025. “Canada’s New National CyberSecurity Strategy.” 6 February. Source
[9] Department of National Defence. 2026. Security,Sovereignty and Prosperity: Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy.February. Source
[10] Global Affairs Canada. “Canada–Russia Relations.”Accessed 7 October 2026. Source
[11] Global Affairs Canada. 2026. “Canada Condemns Iran’sDestabilizing Actions in the Middle East.” 6 September. Source
[12] Canada. Constitution Act, 1867. Sections 91, 92 and 92A.Consolidated text. Source
[13] Supreme Court of Canada. 1998. Reference re Secession ofQuebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. Source
[14] Canada. Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26. Sections 1–3.Consolidated text. Source
[15] Canada. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act,R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23. Section 2. Consolidated text. Source
[16] Hogue, Marie-Josée. 2025. Public Inquiry into ForeignInterference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. FinalReport, Volume 1, especially pp. 3–4 and 37–38. 28 January. Source
[17] Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 2026. CSISPublic Report 2025. “Operations and Analysis,” especially “Foreign Interferenceand Espionage” and “Economic and Research Security.” Source
[18] Office of the Foreign Influence Commissioner of Canada.2026. “Statement from Commissioner Boegman on the Foreign Influence Registry.”16 September. Source
[19] Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. 2024. National CyberThreat Assessment 2025–2026. Source
[20] Natural Resources Canada. 2026. “Canada’s CriticalMinerals Strategy: Progress Update.” Source
[21] NATO. 2025. “The Hague Summit Declaration.” 25 June.Paragraphs 2–3. Source
[22] Department of National Defence. 2026. “Canada Achievesthe 2% of Gross Domestic Product Defence Spending Benchmark.” March. Source
[23] Auditor General of Canada. 2025. Recruiting for Canada’sMilitary. Report 7, tabled 21 October. Audit period 1 April 2022 to 31 March2025. Source
[24] NATO. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. 4 April. Articles3–5. Source
[25] Global Affairs Canada. 2026. “Statement by MinisterLeBlanc Following Trilateral CUSMA Joint Review Meeting.” 1 July. Source
[26] Department of National Defence. “NORAD ModernizationProject Timelines.” Source
[27] Prime Minister of Canada. 2026. “Prime Minister CarneyForges New Strategic Partnership with the People’s Republic of China Focused onEnergy, Agri-Food, and Trade.” 16 January. Source
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