When Ottawa committed to building fifteen new surface combatants based on the British Type 26 design, it was embarking on the most expensive procurement program in Canadian history. Officially costed at around C$60 billion, the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program dwarfs the defence spending of many NATO allies. The question now emerging in defence circles is whether Canada is getting the best deal compared to its closest partners who are buying the same family of frigates.

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A Tale of Three Buyers

‍The United Kingdom, original designer of the Type 26—known locally as the City-class—provides the clearest benchmark. In 2022, London placed an order for a second batch of five ships at £4.2 billion, roughly £840 million per hull. Thanks to the learning curve and major investment in BAE’s Clyde shipyards, the cost per ship is falling as production scales up.Norway, by contrast, has just signed on for five Type 26s at a total price of about £10 billion, or roughly £2 billion per ship if one divides headline figures. The Norwegians are paying a premium to align closely with the Royal Navy’s design, minimizing divergence in systems and enabling joint training, crew exchanges, and potentially even shared maintenance regimes.

Canada, meanwhile, is committed to a larger fleet of fifteen ships at a program cost that could top C$60 billion. This figure includes not just the vessels themselves, but infrastructure upgrades, domestic production costs, and heavily customized combat systems. Ottawa’s ships will be larger and more heavily armed than their British or Norwegian cousins, incorporating advanced radar, air defence, and anti-submarine capabilities to replace both the Halifax-class frigates and the retired Iroquois-class destroyers.

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‍The Economics of Modification

‍From a strictly financial perspective, Canada appears to be paying more per ship than either Britain or Norway. But cost comparisons are never simple. Unlike Oslo, Ottawa has insisted on extensive domestic content, shipyard modernization, and industrial benefits—all of which drive up the top-line figure but also generate jobs and sustain a sovereign shipbuilding base.

The British model shows that economies of scale matter: costs fell markedly with the second production batch. Norway, lacking an indigenous yard capable of constructing the Type 26, opted for a premium “turn-key” solution to maximize interoperability with the Royal Navy. Canada, in choosing a middle course—domestic production with significant design modifications—risks inflating costs without capturing the efficiencies seen in the UK program.

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‍Strategic Payoff or Fiscal Albatross?

‍The question, therefore, is not just whether Canada is overpaying, but whether it is buying the right kind of fleet for its strategic needs. The CSC will be among the most sophisticated frigates afloat, capable of contributing meaningfully to NATO task groups, North Atlantic anti-submarine operations, and continental defence alongside the United States. Few allies outside the United States or Britain will field anything comparable.

Yet the opportunity costs are real. Every dollar spent on CSC is a dollar not available for submarines, Arctic patrol vessels, or space and cyber capabilities—all areas where Canada also faces pressing gaps. Critics argue that the program has become a “one-fleet-to-rule-them-all” procurement, concentrating resources in a single platform.

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‍The Verdict

‍Measured strictly against the UK’s cost-per-hull, Canada’s deal looks expensive. Measured against Norway’s arrangement, it appears more defensible. But in truth, Ottawa is pursuing a different goal: building a fleet that serves both as a strategic asset and as an industrial strategy to keep Canadian yards alive for decades. Whether this gamble pays off will depend less on the sticker price and more on whether the CSC arrives on time, on budget, and fully capable of deterring the threats of the 2030s and beyond.